Moore v. Texas

/in , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: Texas

Filed: 2016/2017

Court: United States Supreme Court, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Overview: The brief before the U.S. Supreme Court in 2016 argued that Texas distorted the clinical definition of intellectual disability by devising a formula of exclusionary factors that rests heavily on stereotypes. This approach is wholly inconsistent with accepted scientific standards and leads to inaccurate and unreliable results. The brief argues that the deliberate decision to reject clinical standards in the adjudication of death penalty cases is inconsistent with prior Supreme Court precedent in Atkins v. Virginia and Hall v. Florida and incompatible with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In 2017, the Court held that Texas’ use of stereotypical and outdated factors—rather than well-established clinical standards—to determine intellectual disability in death penalty cases was unconstitutional, since they “create an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.” The case was then remanded to the Texas Court of Criminal (TCCA) appeals to redo its disability determination consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. The Arc filed another brief in support of Mr. Moore before the TCCA. In 2018, the TCCA again found that Mr. Moore did not have intellectual disability and should be executed. A strong dissent from Judge Elsa Alcala cited The Arc’s amicus brief and noted that the majority opinion was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Mr. Moore again petitioned for U.S. Supreme Court review.

Excerpt: “There is a wide gap between the clinical definition, on the one hand, and on the other, expectations that many laypeople have about what intellectual disability…means…Distorting the definition with invented exclusionary factors is fundamentally inconsistent with the clinical understanding of intellectual disability, and has no support in the scientific and clinical literature in the field…Texas’ invention and adoption of a list of unscientific criteria for adaptive functioning has the effect (and, apparently, the purpose) of limiting the protection of Atkins to a sub-set of those defendants who satisfy the clinical definition of intellectual disability. This is incompatible with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishments. Amici believe that the basic framework of the clinical definition is the constitutionally required standard for determining whether a defendant has intellectual disability.”

Case Documents

U.S. Supreme Court Brief

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Brief

2017 U.S. Supreme Court Decision

2018 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Decision

2019 U.S. Supreme Court Decision

Press Releases

Related Media

Ortiz v. United States

/in , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: Missouri

Filed: 2010

Court: U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Overview: The briefs before the Eighth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court, argued that the Courts must consider the consensus of the scientific community that only Mr. Ortiz’s adaptive deficits and not his adaptive strengths are relevant to an intellectual disability determination. The Arc also submitted a clemency letter to President Barack Obama requesting the commutation of Mr. Ortiz’s sentence.

Excerpt: “Like everyone else, individuals with intellectual disability differ substantially from one another. For each person with intellectual disability there will be things he or she cannot do but also many things he or she can do. Because the mixture of skill strengths and skill deficits varies widely among persons with intellectual disability, there is no clinically accepted list of common, ordinary strengths or abilities that preclude a diagnosis of intellectual disability. Thus, in assessing an individual’s adaptive behavior—the aspect of intellectual disability at issue in this case—the focus must be on deficits. Adaptive strengths are irrelevant to this analysis…Broad acceptance of the district court’s mistaken reasoning would deprive individuals with intellectual disability of the protections and supports to which they are entitled under state and federal law and the U.S. Constitution.”

Case Documents

Eighth Circuit Brief

U.S. Supreme Court Brief

Clemency Letter

Related Media

Press Release: “Justice For Abelardo Arboleda Ortiz In the Final Days of a Presidency”

Press Release: “The Arc on Commutation for Death Row Inmate Abelardo Arboleda Ortiz In the Final Days of Obama’s Presidency”

Lizcano v. Texas

/in , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: Texas

Filed: 2015

Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Overview: The brief argued that Texas’ use of the Briseno factors to determine intellectual disability in death penalty cases was unconstitutional because they are based on stereotypes rather than well-established clinical standards.

Excerpt: “In implementing this Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, Texas has essentially replaced the clinical definition’s carefully crafted requirements with a formula of its own devising, one that rests heavily on stereotypes about people with intellectual disability. This approach is inconsistent with accepted clinical standards.”

Case Documents

Amicus Brief: Lizcano v. Texas

City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan

/in , , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: California

Filed: 2015

Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Overview: The brief argued that a woman with mental illness who was shot five times by police at her group home while experiencing a mental health crisis could sue the city of San Francisco under Title II of the ADA for failure to provide her with reasonable accommodations in the process of arresting her.

Excerpt: “It is critical to the lives of persons with many types of disabilities that police departments adopt and implement policies and practices that take disability into account during police interactions. Approximately half of all fatal police interactions involve persons with psychiatric disabilities…Title II of the ADA requires nondiscrimination and reasonable modifications (also known as reasonable accommodations) in policing activities, including in the type of detention at the heart of this case. In the context of a person with a known psychiatric disability, who is in crisis and subject to involuntary mental health treatment, the ADA requires that police employ widely accepted policing practices that use containment, coordination, communication, and time to seek safe resolutions.”

Case Documents

Amicus Brief: City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan

U.S. Supreme Court Opinion

Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell

/in , , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: Connecticut

Filed: 2017

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Overview: The brief argued that the requirement that the state adopt standards that focus its special education efforts on students “who can profit from some form of elementary and secondary education,” rather than “spend fruitlessly on some at the expense of others,” violates the IDEA, which mandates that all students with disabilities be provided a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. The brief focused on research demonstrating that even students with the most severe disabilities can learn and often exceed expectations, the legislative history of the IDEA making clear that all students with disabilities are guaranteed the right to an education, and the fact that failure to educate these students violates the ADA’s integration mandate which has been vital in ensuring that people with disabilities have access to opportunities that allow them to live in the community, learn in general education settings, obtain post-secondary education, and work in integrated jobs at competitive wages.

Excerpt: “The IDEA’s mandate that schools must educate all students with disabilities extends to children with an array of cognitive, physical, sensory, health, and alertness disabilities – those known as having a ‘profound’ disability because they have variable patterns of reflexive movements, minimal or inconsistent responses to stimuli, small response repertories, few voluntary behaviors, and/or variability in alertness and orienting. The obligation extends to these students because they are able to benefit from education, including education in the general curriculum; they are able to master functional and academic skills; they are able to learn and make progress in academic, functional, and developmental domains; and they are able to do so when educated with children without disabilities. Indeed, the science of educability does not justify educators, or any other persons, in assuming that a student’s current cognitive or communicative skills are fixed or absolute and thus represent the highest level of the student’s capacity.”

Case Documents

Amicus Brief: Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell

CT Supreme Court Opinion

Related Media

Press Release: “The Arc Responds to Connecticut Court Ruling on Education and Access for Children with Disabilities”

The Arc Blog: “Good Outcome in Connecticut School Funding Case”

Hartford Courant: “Parents Of Special Needs Children Join Appeal Of Education Funding Decision”

Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1

/in , , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: Colorado

Filed: 2016, 2017

Court: U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado

Overview: The brief before the U.S. Supreme Court argued that Congress’ move to standards-based education and the IDEA amendments make the Tenth Circuit Court’s bare-bones “merely more than de-minimis” standard for educational benefit untenable. The brief—in support of Drew, a child with autism who was not making progress under his IEP—argued that the IDEA requires school districts to provide students with disabilities an equal opportunity to meet the standards the district applies to all children and that any deviation from that universal standard must be tied to the unique needs of each child. In 2017, the Court issued a unanimous decision definitively rejecting the “merely more than de minimis” standard and holding that the “IDEA demands more.” In 2017, another amicus brief before the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado asked the court to find that the IEP at issue was not “appropriately ambitious” in light of the “markedly more demanding” standard outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Excerpt: “In the years since Rowley, Congress has not been silent. To the contrary, it has repeatedly amended the IDEA. Where the Rowley Court found that Congress had not adopted language providing a ‘substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children,’ the post-Rowley amendments have progressively expanded States’ substantive obligations under the statute. These amendments make clear that a school district’s educational interventions must provide a child with a disability an equal opportunity to meet the standards the district applies to all children. Any deviation from that universal standard must be tied to the unique needs of the child. The Tenth Circuit’s merely-more-than-de-minimis test therefore falls far short of the requirements that Congress has imposed since Rowley.”

Status: In 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that the school district did not provide an adequate education and must reimburse the family for private school tuition, noting that the IEP “was not appropriately ambitious” under the new standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court since it did not provide the plaintiff with a chance “to meet challenging objectives under his particular circumstances.”

Case Documents

U.S. Supreme Court Brief

U.S. Supreme Court Opinion

U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado Brief

U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado Opinion

Related Media

The Arc Blog, “The Arc Applauds U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Special Education Case: ‘The IDEA Demands More’”

New York Times, “Supreme Court Rejects Education Minimum Applied by Gorsuch”

In the Matter of Lacee L.

/in , , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: New York

Filed: 2018

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Overview: The brief supported a mother with intellectual disability who had her child removed from her care without receiving appropriate accommodations from the state’s child welfare agency that would have allowed her an equal chance to parent effectively. The brief argued that the court must recognize the important role that the family and appellate courts have in enforcing the rights of parents with intellectual disability to receive the supports and accommodations they need to preserve and reunify their families. The brief also provided background on the meaning of an intellectual disability diagnosis, the long history of discrimination against parents with intellectual disability, and the social science and personal stories that show how people with intellectual disability can flourish as parents when provided the supports and services they need to thrive.

Excerpt: “Individuals with intellectual disability can learn how to parent, improve their parenting skills, and parent successfully with appropriate support. Robust enforcement of the reasonable accommodations requirement of the ADA is essential to guaranteeing that they have an equal opportunity to do so.”

Status: In 2018, the Court found that the child welfare agency had met the reasonable efforts requirement and provided all accommodations required. However, on the broader issue of the applicability of the ADA to the proceedings, the Court did state: “An agency, like ACS, that is subject to Title II of the ADA must make ‘reasonable accommodations’ to allow ‘meaningful access’ to government services…To be sure, ACS must comply with the ADA.”

Case Documents

Amicus Brief: In the Matter of Lacee L.

New York Court of Appeals Opinion

In Re Elijah C.

/in , , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: Connecticut

Filed: 2016

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Overview: The brief supported a mother with intellectual disability and schizophrenia whose parental rights were terminated by the state’s child welfare agency, despite the agency failing to provide necessary accommodations to the mother throughout the process. The brief argued that termination of parental rights and neglect proceedings are “programs, services, and activities” that must comply with Title II of the ADA.

Excerpt: “Parents with intellectual and psychiatric disabilities face profound challenges when their government accuses them of unfitness. Though nine decades have passed since Justice Holmes upheld the forced sterilization of “mental defectives”…we are not so far removed from Holmes’ bias: Ten states still permit the involuntary sterilization of persons with disabilities; some in language that echoes Holmes’ disdain for its subjects. In Connecticut, parents with intellectual and psychiatric disabilities confront more than just a legacy of discrimination: They also contend with a know-it-when-you-see-it reunification standard and case law that forbids consideration of the ADA. Holding that compliance with the ADA is mandatory in termination and neglect proceedings will remove these two barriers to fair and accurate assessment of the parental fitness of persons with intellectual and psychiatric disabilities.”

Status: In 2017, the Court held that the mother was unable to benefit from reunification efforts. The Court further held that “it is the law of this state that child welfare proceedings are subject to the provisions of the ADA insofar as they involve the services, programs, or activities of any stage agency…the department’s failure to make reasonable modifications to its services, programs or activities to accommodate a parent’s disability would likely preclude a finding…that the department’s reunification efforts were reasonable under the circumstances…We therefore continue to encourage trial courts to look to the ADA for guidance in fashioning appropriate services for parents with disabilities.”

Case Documents

Amicus Brief: In Re Elijah C.

Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion

In Re Hicks/Brown

/in , , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: Michigan

Filed: 2016

Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Overview: The brief supported a mother with intellectual disability arguing that the state failed in its statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family unit because the case service plan never included reasonable accommodations to provide her with a meaningful opportunity to benefit, as required by the ADA.

Excerpt: “The Court of Appeals in this case reached the correct conclusion: when a state agency fails to provide reasonable accommodations to a parent with disabilities in a case service plan, the agency fails in its statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. When this happens, the state simply cannot satisfy the high burden (i.e., clear and convincing evidence) required to take the drastic measure of terminating parental rights. Failing to provide a parent with disabilities with an appropriate case service plan necessarily leaves a ‘hole’ in the evidence that prohibits a court from finding that the requisite grounds for termination have been satisfied. How can a trier of fact find evidence so clear and weighty to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, that a person with disabilities cannot remedy the grounds leading to adjudication or otherwise provide proper care for his or her child when the parent was never given the appropriate reasonable accommodations? The answer is, as the Court of Appeals held, that they cannot. The American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Michigan Probate Code, as well as common sense, dictate such a ruling.”

Case Documents

Amicus Brief: In Re Hicks/Brown

Supreme Court of Michigan Opinion

In the Matter of Michael A.

/in , , , , , , , /by The Arc

State: New York

Filed: 2017

Court: New York Supreme Court

Overview: The brief supported a mother with intellectual disability arguing that the state’s child welfare agency had failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son in violation of Title II of the ADA.

Excerpt: “While much research exists demonstrating the ability of individuals with intellectual disability to parent with needed supports, parents with intellectual disability…remain an especially vulnerable population given pervasive and harmful stereotypes of people with disabilities. Their abilities are frequently underestimated, and they remain subject to the outdated notion that, by reason of their disabilities alone, they are simply incapable of parenting. Without proper enforcement of the ADA, these vulnerable parents have no recourse or remedy should [the child welfare agency] deny them equal access to the services, programs, or activities that they and their families require to reunite or to remain together.”

Case Documents

Amicus Brief: In the Matter of Michael A.